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The New Merger Guidelines and the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Stephen Calkinst
At the Fifteenth New England Antitrust Conference in November
1981, the newly appointed Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division expressed dissatisfaction with
his predecessors' method of measuring market concentration:
We think that a rather more sophisticated way of thinking about
concentration is appropriate. The four-firm concentration ratio has
very serious drawbacks as a measure. It implicitly assumes that size
distribution among the first four firms is irrelevant, which is obviously
silly. It implicitly assumes that size distribution among firms five
through N is irrelevant, which is obviously silly. There are better meas-
ures of concentration than that.'
The better measure of concentration to which Mr. Baxter referred
was the Herfindabl-Hirschman Index (HHI).2 The Antitrust Division
began using this index as part of its screening of mergers 3 early in Mr.
Baxter's tenure, and by the time the Justice Department's new Merger
Guidelines were issued on June 14, 1982, the HHI had replaced con-
centration ratios (CR's)4 as the primary method of measuring concen-
tration in the Antitrust Division's internal deliberations.5 Since the
t Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. A.B. 1972, Yale University; J.D.
1975, Harvard University. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of John deQ. Briggs,
Michael Denger, Eleanor Fox, and especially J. Mark Iwry. I also profited from discussions with
colleagues too numerous to mention.
I. W. Baxter, Current Enforcement Policy of the Antitrust Division, Remarks at the Fif-
teenth New England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 13-14, 1981), reprinted in Sixteenth New England
Antitrust Conference 7 (1982); see also Baxter Offers Enforcement Positions on Price Fixing, Corpo.
rate Acquisitions, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1025, at AA-I (July 30, 1981)
(Interview with Mr. Baxter).
2. This index also is frequently referred to simply as the Herfmdahl Index. See infra note
38.
3. Following the Guidelines, this Article adopts the convention of referring to both mergers
and acquisitions as "mergers." The antitrust analysis is the same for both types of transactions.
4. A concentration ratio is the sum of the market shares of a specified number of firms
(conventionally four). W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, ECONOMICS 523 (2d ed. 1982). Where market
shares are computed from sales, a CR4 would be the ratio of the leading four firms' sales to total
sales in the market. It is generally recognized that CR's and the HHI are the two most widely
accepted measures of concentration. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 913, at 74-75
(1980); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 274 (2d
ed. 1980).
5. Interview with Mark P. Leddy, Deputy Director for Operations in the Antitrust Division
(Oct. 29, 1982).
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stated purpose of the new Guidelines is to "describe the general princi-
ples and specific standards normally used by the Department in analyz-
ing mergers,"6 it is not surprising that the HHI has been incorporated
into the Guidelines. Of course, the Guidelines' drafters aspire to more
than a descriptive role.7 The 1968 Merger Guidelines8 had an impor-
tant influence on successor administrations, 9 courts,' 0 the Federal
Trade Commission, commentators and students,' 2 and firms contem-
plating mergers and their counsel. Presumably its drafters anticipate
that the new Guidelines will make a comparable impact, and that the
HHI will gain general recognition as the preferred measure of
concentration.
This Article begins by describing the HHI, its principal properties,
and its use in the Guidelines, the literature, and the case law. It then
evaluates the advantages of the HHI as compared to CR's, the measure
of concentration used in the 1968 Guidelines.13 Finally, it considers
the practical consequences of changing to the HHI, and the wisdom of
this change. This Article concludes that use of the HHI in the new
Guidelines probably will change few prosecutorial or adjudicatory de-
cisions about mergers except as part of a larger process of instilling in
the Antitrust Division staff, and perhaps tribunals and successor ad-
ministrations, a more lenient attitude toward mergers than formerly
6. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 1, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493, 28,494 (1982), reprinted
in 71 CALIF. L. REV. 649, 649-50 (1983) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as Guidelines];
see also Baxter, .4 Justice Department Perspective, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 287, 287 (1982) (describing
the Guidelines as "a fairly careful description of a way of going about thinking about mergers-a
thought process about mergers-and our own intuitive reactions to a series of mergers that we saw
over a period of time."); William French Smith, Introduction to Merger Guidelines, reprinted in
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 546, at 5 (June 16, 1982) (special supplement to 2 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 4225 (Aug. 9, 1982)).
7. Areeda, Justice's Merger Guidelines: The General Theory, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 303 (1983);
ef Fed Is Advised to Defer Action on Guides Until Justice Unveils Revised Merger Guidelines, 42
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at 826 (Apr. 22, 1982) (Baxter urged Federal Reserve
Board to issue merger guidelines only after reviewing the ones to be published by DOJ).
8. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines-1968 (May 30, 1968), reprinted in 2 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 4510, at 6881-89 [hereinafter cited as 1968 Guidelines].
9. See Edwards, Joffe, Kolasky, McGowan, Mendez-Penate, Ordover, Proger, Soloman &
Toepke, Proposed Revisions of the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1543, 1547 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Edwards Task Force]; Government Litigation Under Sec-
tion 7: The Old Merger Guidelines and the New Antitrust Majority, Address by Donald Baker
before the Southwestern Legal Foundation 8-10 (Feb. 24, 1977).
10. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 7, MERGER STANDARDS UNDER U.S.
ANTITRUST LAWS 69-79 (1981); Edwards Task Force, supra note 9, at 1547; C. Mendez-Penate,
The Guidelines in the Courts: An Overview (1981) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
California Law Review).
11. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 10, at 69-79; Edwards Task Force, supra note 9, at
1546-47.
12. See, ag., R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 457-64 (2d ed. 1981); L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 620 (1977).
13. 1968 Guidelines, supra note 8, paras. 5-6, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 6884.
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prevailed. Except to the extent one considers this effect valuable, how-
ever, the costs of changing measures of concentration appear to out-
weigh the benefits.
I
DESCRIPTION OF THE HHI AND ITS USE IN THE
GUIDELINES
A. Properties of the HHI
Calculating an HHI is a straightforward process once percentage
market shares are determined.' 4 The market share of each participant
in the market is squared, and the resulting amounts are then totalled.I5
Thus, the HHI for a market consisting of three firms with shares of
50%, 30%, and 20%, respectively, is the sum of 502, 302, and 202, or 2500
+ 900 + 400 = 3800.16
Several important properties of the HHI are readily apparent.
First, the HHI is highly responsive to asymmetry of market shares. For
any given number of participants in a market, the HHI will be lowest
when market shares are equal, and highest when one firm has an ex-
tremely large share of the market. To vary the example given above, a
market consisting of three firms with equal shares has an HHI of 3333
(33-1/ 2 x 3 = 1111 x 3 = 3333), but a three-firm market in which one
firm has a 99% share would have an HHI of more than 9800 (992 =
9801). This sensitivity to asymmetry is one of the principal claimed
advantages of the HHI.'7
This sensitivity, however, carries with it a serious drawback: small
errors in estimating the leading firms' market shares can produce large
differences in the HHI.V 8 The significance of the error win itself vary
according to the sizes of the shares that are inadvertently overestimated
and the shares that are correspondingly reduced. Take as an example a
four-firm market where the two leading firms have 40% shares and the
14. An HHI, like any other measure of concentration, is limited by the quality of the defini-
tion of the (product and geographic) market whose competitiveness it is measuring and the preci-
sion of the market shares used. Eg., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Explanation and Summary of the
Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4500, at 6881-2 (August 9, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as DOJ Explanation].
15. Guidelines § III(A), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 655.
16. Alternatively, this computation could use market shares expressed as decimal fractions
(.52 + .32 + .22 = .25 + .09 + .04 = .38), as had been more common heretofore. See, e.g., F.
SCHERER, supra note 4, at 58; Weinstock, Using the Herfindahl lndex to Measure Concentration, 27
ANTITRUST BULL. 285, 286-87 (1982). The Guidelines wisely avoid decimals and thus make the
HHI easier to understand and accept. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (HHI used
erroneously because decimals gave the illusion of low concentration and small changes in HHI).
17. Eg.,DOJExplanation, supra note 14, at 6881-2; 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note
4, 913a, at 75-76; W. Baxter, supra note 1.
18. F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 58.
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other two 10% shares. This distribution would result in an HHI of 3400
(402 + 402 + 102 + 102 = 1600 + 1600 + 100 + 100 = 3400). Now
suppose that the market share of one of the leading firms is erroneously
estimated as 45% rather than 40%. If at the same time the other leader's
share is estimated as 35%, then the HHI is increased only by 50 (452 +
352 + 102 + 102 = 2025 + 1225 + 100 + 100 = 3450). But if it is the
share of one of the smaller firms that is underestimated, as by assigning
that firm only a 5% share, the HHI increases to 3750 (452 + 402 + 102 +
52 = 2025 + 1600 + 100 + 25 = 3750), exceeding its correct value by
over 10%.19
A second important property of the HHI is that it reflects the
shares of every firm in the market. There is no need for an a priori
determination of how many firms are significant in measuring market
concentration; such a determination, which is inevitably somewhat ar-
bitrary,2° obviously must be made before computing a CR. This fea-
ture of the HHI is regularly cited as one of the HHI's advantages,2'
although it is beneficial only if summing each firm's squared market
share accurately indicates the competitiveness of the market. The fact
that the HHI includes every firm also is cited as a potential limitation
on its use, given the difficulty of learning smaller market shares, 22 al-
though it is unlikely that fringe firms will contribute significantly to
HH's that are reaching levels of antitrust concern.23
A third attribute of the HHI, demonstrated in 1969 by Morris
Adelman, is that any HHI can be interpreted as a "numbers
equivalent."'24 This means that one can readily compute the number of
firms with equal market shares that would be necessary to produce any
given HHI. This is done by multiplying the HHI by 0.0001 and taking
19. According to the Guidelines, competitive concerns about concentration become "signifi-
cant" when the HHI reaches 1000 and they become "quite serious" when it reaches 1800. Guide-
lines § III(A)(1)(b), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 656.
20. But see Kwoka, The Effect of Market Share Distribution on Industry Performance, 61
REv. ECON. & STAT. 101 (1979) (empirical study indicating superiority of CR2). CR4's were used
widely in U.S. research because the U.S. Census Bureau chose to collect data for CR4's. The
United Kingdom, on the other hand, used CR3's. G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
30 (1968).
21. See, e.g., 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, T 913al, at 75; W. Baxter, supra note
1; J. Grundfest, Antitrust Analysis, Market Concentration and the Herfindahl Index 11-12, 17
(Oct. 1, 1981) (unpublished manuscript on file with the California Law Review).
22. See, e.g., Markham, Concentration" A Stimulus Or Retardant to Innovation?, in INDUS-
TRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 247, 259 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston
eds. 1974).
23. See Guidelines § III(A) n.29, 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497 n.29, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 655 n.29;
F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 58; Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Heifindahl Concentration, Rivalry, and
Mergers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1857, 1866 (1982).
24. Adelman, Comment on the "W" Concentration Measure as a Numbers-Equivalent, 51
REv. ECON. & STAT. 99 (1969).
19831
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the reciprocal of that product. 25 For example, an HHI of 1250 corre-
sponds to a market of eight equal-sized firms, since the reciprocal of
0.125 (1250 x 0.0001) is 8. Conversely, to obtain the HHI correspond-
ing to a market with a given number of equal-sized firms, one multi-
plies the reciprocal of that number by 10,000. Accordingly, the HHI
corresponding to a market of five equal-sized firms would be 1/5 x
10,000 = 2000. This property aids in conceptualizing the meaning of a
particular HHI value.26
B. Use of the HHi in the Guidelines
The Guidelines use the HHI for three quite different purposes.
The first, and most novel, application is to demarcate so-called "safe
harbors."27 According to the Guidelines, the Department is unlikely to
challenge any merger, no matter how large, that would produce a post-
merger HHI of less than 1000.28 There is some suggestion that this safe
harbor is intended by the Justice Department to establish almost a
guarantee that a merger will not be challenged-a stronger promise, for
instance, than the Department's representation that it is unlikely to
challenge mergers increasing the HHI by less than threshold amounts
in more concentrated markets. 29
The second purpose for which the Guidelines use the HHI is the
same as that for which concentration statistics were employed in the
1968 Guidelines: to establish a certain level of concentration (a post-
merger HHI above 1800, in the case of the new Guidelines) that trig-
25. Since Adelman was using HHI's in decimal form, see supra note 16, multiplying by
0.0001 was unnecessary.
26. For instance, the Guidelines have engaged in this type of conceptualization. See Guide-
lines § III(A)(1), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L. REv. at 656.
27. See Baxter, supra note 6, at 291; Smith, Changing Enforcement Policy, 51 ANTITRUST
L.J. 95, 101 (1982).
28. Guidelines § III(A)(1)(a), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L. REv. at 656. Measuring
HHrs on a postmerger basis serves as an important limitation. For instance, a merger leading to
the formation of a firm with a 31% market share would be analyzed with an HHI of more than 961
(312).
The Guidelines report that an empirical study of firm dispersion indicated that an HHI of
1000 corresponds to a CR4 of 50%. Guidelines § HI(A), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497,71 CALIF. L. REV.
at 655-56. Accord Scarbrough & Pfunder, New Merger Guidelines Not Ahays Less Restrictive,
Legal Times (Washington), Jan. 10, 1983, at 19, 27 (Monte Carlo simulation assuming 25 firms
with a log-normal distribution; HHI of 1000 found to correspond to CR4 of 50.8%). Although
highly unlikely, a 1000-point HHI could be associated with CR4's as great as 63% and as small as
32%. P. Pautler, A Guide to the Herfindahl Index for Antitrust Attorneys 14 (fig. 1) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the California Law Review) (forthcoming in 5 RESEARCH IN L. & ECON,
(Fall 1983)).
29. Cf. Baxter, supra note 6, at 291 ("Heeding the admonition, 'never say never,' we did not
quite come out and say 'we will never attack mergers in that region.' But I truly expect it will be
an unusual phenomenon where difficulty is found with a merger answering that description.").
[Vol. 71:402
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gers a more stringent standard of review for horizontal mergers.3 0
Moreover, this threshold is not a bright line test. The higher the HHI,
the greater the likelihood that a horizontal merger will be challenged,
irrespective of whether the HHI exceeds 1800.3 1
Finally, the Guidelines use the increase in the HHI caused by a
merger to measure quantitatively the likely competitive impact of a
merger. The 1968 Guidelines indicated the Department normally
would challenge mergers in "less highly concentrated" markets involv-
ing firms with shares of at least 5% and 5%, 10% and 4%, 15% and 3%,
20% and 2%, or 25% and 1%, and mergers in "highly concentrated"
markets with shares of at least 4% and 4%, 10% and 2%, or 15% and
1%.32 The new Guidelines, by contrast, quantitatively measure the im-
pact of a merger by the resulting increase in the HHI, which is consid-
erably simpler. This increase is equal to twice the product of the
market shares of the merging firms; a merger of firms with market
shares a and b will increase the HHI by 2ab. Where a market will be
"highly concentrated" following a merger, the Department is unlikely
30. Compare Guidelines § III(A)(l)(a), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 656
(setting out threshold for "highly concentrated" markets) with 1968 Guidelines, supra note 8, para.
7, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 6884 (same). Such a use is well established in the case law. E.g.,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271, 279-80 (1964); Grumman
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1981). The 1968 Guidelines used a premerger
measure (CR4 of 75%), whereas the new Guidelines use a postmerger measure. The new Guide-
lines also use the 1800 point threshold to identify markets in which potential competition may be
important, Guidelines § IV(A)(3)(a), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,500, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 661, and in
which vertical mergers may lessen competition, id § IV(B)(1)(c), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,501, 71 CALIF.
L. REV. at 663-64. This Article discusses only the horizontal Merger Guidelines' use of the HHI,
since successful government challenges of non-horizontal mergers are rare.
The Guidelines report that an empirical study of firm dispersion indicated that an HHI of
1800 corresponded to a CR4 of 70%. Guidelines § III(A), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. at 655-56. See also Scarbrough & Pfunder, supra note 28 (Monte Carlo simulation assuming
25 firms with a log-normal distribution; HHI of 1800 found to correspond with a CR4 of 67.3%).
Although highly unlikely, an 1800-point HHI could be associated with CR4's as great as 85% and
as small as 42%. P. Pautler, supra note 28.
31. Guidelines § III(A)(l)(b)-(c), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 656-57; Bax-
ter, supra note 6, at 292.
The Guidelines also contain a "leading firm proviso" that states that the Department is likely
to challenge any merger involving a leading firm with a 35% share and another firm with a share
of at least 1%, where the second largest firm in the industry is approximately half the size of the
leader (or smaller). Id § III(A)(2), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497-98, 71 CALIF. L. RE. at 657.
32. 1968 Guidelines, supra note 8, paras. 5-6, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 6884. Under the
current Guidelines the thresholds for "less highly concentrated" markets are (in whole numbers)
7% & 7%, 8% & 6%, 10% & 5%, 12% & 4%, 16% & 3%, 25% & 2%, and 50% & 1%. Guidelines
§ III(A)(l)(b) n.31, 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497 n.31, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 656 n.31.
The thresholds for "highly concentrated" markets are (in whole numbers) 5% & 5%, 6% & 4%,
8% & 3%, 12% & 2%, and 25% & 1%. Guidelines § III(A)(1) nn.31-32, 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497
nn.31-32, 71 CALIF. L. RE. at 656 nn.31-32.
33. Guidelines § III(A)(1) n.30, 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497 n.30, 71 CALIF. L. REv. at 656 n.30.
The Guidelines explain this conclusion as follows. Before the merger, the two firms contribute
separately to the HHI, and their contributions together equal a2 + b2 . The merger results in a firm
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to challenge a merger if it increases the HHI by less than 50 points.34 It
is likely to challenge a merger if it increases the HHI by 100 points or
more,35 and the Department will use a number of additional factors in
deciding whether to challenge a merger increasing the HHI by an
amount between those two figures.36 In markets that will not be highly
concentrated following a merger, the Department is unlikely to chal-
lenge either "safe harbor" mergers or mergers increasing the HHI by
less than 100 points.37
Like the HHI itself, this third application of the HHI is quite sensi-
tive to disparities in firm sizes. For any given combined share, the in-
crease in the HHI will be highest where the two firms have equal
market shares, and lowest where the inequality is extreme. For exam-
ple, in the case of a merger of two firms with a combined market share
of 10%, the postmerger HHI increase will vary from 50 points (5% and
5%) to 18 points (9% and 1%).
The reasons for using the HHI can best be understood, and the
persuasiveness of those reasons can be more readily evaluated, by re-
viewing the gradual ascendancy of the HHI as a measure of
concentration.
II
THE HISTORY OF THE HHI
When William Baxter introduced the HHI in the Department of
Justice, he took it from the literature of industrial organization, not
from judicial precedent. While the HHI has prospered, albeit hesi-
tantly at first, in the writings of economists and lawyer-economists, it
has appeared only rarely and to mixed reviews in the case law.
A. The HHI in the Literature
The names Herflindahl and Hirschman have been linked not be-
with a share of (a + b) and a contribution to the HHI of (a + b)2 . Since (a + b)2 = a2 + 2ab + b 2,
the increase is 2ab.
34. Combinations of the following market shares represent HHI increases of approximately
50 points: 5% & 5%, 6% & 4%, 8% & 3%, 12% & 2%. Guidelines § III(A)(1)(c) n.32, 47 Fed. Reg.
at 28,497 n.32, 71 CALIF. L. Rv. at 656 n.32.
35. Combinations of the following market shares represent HHI increases of approximately
100 points: 7% & 7%, 8% & 6%, 10% & 5%, 12% & 4%, 16% & 3%, 25% & 2%. Id § III(A)(l)(b)
n.31, 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497 n.31, 71 CALIF. L. REv. at 656 n.31.
36. Id § III(A)(1)(c), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L. REv. at 656-57. These additional
factors are ease of entry; relevant product heterogeneity; closeness of next-best substitutes; differ-
ences in the products and in the selling locations of the merging firms; absence of detailed market
information about specific transactions, prices, and output levels; bulkiness of orders; and other
indicia of competitive market behavior and likelihood of continued competitive behavior. Id
§ III(B)-(C), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,498-99, 71 CALIF. L. REv. at 657-60.
37. Id § III(A)(l)(a)-(b), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L. REv. at 656.
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cause the two men worked together to develop the index, but rather
because each developed it independently. 3 Hirschman used a varia-
tion of it as a measure of the concentration of a country's foreign
trade.39 Herfindahl proposed his version of the index because tradi-
tional measures of concentration were sensitive only to disparities in
market shares, not to paucity of competitors.40 He used it to measure
"gross changes" in the concentration of the United States steel industry,
and cautioned that "[o]n a priori grounds, a concentration coefficient
probably cannot be trusted to move closely with the degree of
monopoly." 4'
Herfindahl's thesis adviser, George Stigler, was probably more im-
portant than either Herfindahl or Hirschman in bringing about the ac-
ceptance of the HHI.42  Stigler demonstrated that under certain
conditions the HHI measures the expected normal fluctuation of mar-
ket shares, with a lower HHI indicating greater fluctuation. This is im-
portant, Stigler argued, because the likelihood of collusion depends on
the ability of colluding firms to detect cheating on agreed prices. Stable
market shares facilitate the detection of cheating, because slippage in
market share is unlikely absent cheating.43 Stigler thus suggests that
the HHI is an appropriate measure of concentration "if we wish con-
centration to measure likelihood of effective collusion."'
Despite some questioning of Stigler's assumptions-questioning to
which we return below--the HHI soon became many economists' ideal
measure of concentration.45 It appeared in the legal literature in 1969
when Richard Posner advocated its use as a measure of concentra-
tion.46 Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner later endorsed the HHI, al-
38. See Hirschman, The Paternity of an Index, 54 AM. ECON. REv. 761 (1964). The index is
sometimes referred to as the "Herfindahl Index," see, e.g., 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note
4, 1 913a2, at 76, but this fails to accord recognition to Hirschman, the original proponent of the
index. The Guidelines appropriately use the term "Herfindahl-Hirschman Index."
39. A. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE 98-99,
155-62 (1945).
40. 0. Herfindahl, Concentration in the Steel Industry 16-18 (1950) (doctoral thesis on file
with the California Law Review).
41. Id at 22, 169. The historical origin of the index is discussed in Fox, The New Merger
Guidelines-4 Blueprint for Microeconomic Analysis, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 519, 569-74 (1982).
42. StiglerA Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964); see J. Kwoka, The Herfindahl
Index in Theory and Practice (Dec. 1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with the California Law
Review).
43. See G. STIGLER, supra note 20, at 31.
44. Stigler, supra note 42, at 55.
45. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 51-52
(1st ed. 1970); Markham, supra note 22, at 258; Schmalensee, Using the H-Index of Concentration
with Published Data, 59 REv. ECON. & STAT. 186 (1977). It may be more accurate to call the HHI
an idealized measure, because the paucity of data meant it was seldom used. See infra note 109.
46. Posner, Oligopoly and theAntitrust Laws: A SuggestedApproach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562,
1602-03 (1969). Posner suggested defining a "safe harbor" at the same 1000 point level used in the
1983]
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beit without enthusiasm.47 Only recently, a task force of lawyers and
economists proposing new merger guidelines also concluded that the
HHI should be used to measure concentration.48
B. The HHZ in the Courts
Merger cases normally use CR's to measure market concentration
and combined market shares to measure the impact of a merger.49 Al-
most every judicial and Federal Trade Commission merger decision
has measured concentration by CR's (most commonly. CR4's)5 0 Most
merger cases have determined the antitrust significance of a merger by
focusing on the combined market shares of the merged firms.- In con-
trast, the HHI has appeared in opinions in only six cases, and most of
these cases are, to a greater or lesser degree, embarrassments.5 2 The
HHI's checkered history in litigation is powerful testimony to the dan-
ger posed by a little knowledge of economics.-3 If nothing else, the
Guidelines' explication of the HHI should raise the level of judicial
discourse on economic principles.
The HHI's first and most ignominious appearance in the reported
Guidelines, id. at 1603, and further suggested automatically challenging any merger in industries
with HHI's over 2000 where the HHI increase due to the merger exceeded 40. Id Posner made
clear he cared more about the approach than the particular numbers. See also R. POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 55 n.26 (1976).
47. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, 913b2.
48. Edwards Task Force, supra note 9, at 1561, 1564.
49. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38, 343 (1962); Tenneco,
Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 1982).
50. See cases collected in 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, 1 909, at 29-51.
51. Eg., United States v. Philadelphia Na'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963); Liggett & My-
ers, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1074 (1976), afd, 567 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1977); see 4 P. AREEDA & D. TUR-
NER, supra note 4, 909; 13 B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS
§ 8.02[2][a] (1982). Courts less frequently have looked at the increase in market share resulting
from the merger. Id § 8.02[2][a][i].
52. As will be shown, the HHI was incorrectly used and ultimately rejected in United States
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976), and Litton Indus. 82 F.T.C. 793, 799
(1972) (initial decision), rev'd, 82 F.T.C. 979 (1973), mod#Fed, 85 F.T.C. 333 (1975). It was ac-
knowledged as an acceptable measure of concentration but nonetheless not used in BASF Wyan-
dotte Corp., No. 9125 (FTC May 14, 1982) (initial decision) (available on LEXIS, Trade library,
FTC file), order adopted, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,941 (FTC July 12, 1982), and Marathon
Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315, 323 n.15 (N.D. Ohio), afj'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982), and it was relied on without its exact level being determined in
Pabst Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., No. Civ. 82-440 (D. Del. July 21, 1982) (order
granting preliminary injunction). The HHI was used correctly, but as only cumulative evidence,
in Kellogg Co., No. 8883 (FTC Sept. 1, 1981) (initial decision), noted at 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 21,864 (1981), vacated and complaint dismissed, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,899
(FTC Jan. 15, 1982). Judge Mansfield's recent dissent in Tenneco, 689 F.2d at 359, also mentioned
the HHI in noting that the market in issue was concentrated whether one applied CR's or the
HHI.
53. See generally Hay, A Confused Lawyer's Guide to the Predatory Pricing Literature, in
STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 155, 155-56 (S. Salop ed. 1981).
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cases was in the initial decision in Litton Industries, Inc. 54 The case
involved the acquisition by Litton of most of the stock of Triumph-
Werke Nurnberg, A.G., Adlerwerke A.G., and their associated compa-
nies.55 It presented the still vexing question of whether mergers of rela-
tively small firms in markets with dominant competitors should be
discouraged in order to preserve opportunities for possible deconcen-
tration, or allowed in order to promote "viable" competition.
56
The hearing examiner boldly adopted the HHI as the proper
measure of concentration in view of IBM's dominant role, saying that
the "two and four firm" concentration index of measuring concentra-
tion is inappropriate in this case....
The Herfindahl Index, on the other hand, presents a more realistic
picture of competition in this industry because it takes precise account
of each company's market share and therefore reflects the exact compo-
sition of the industry.
5 7
Only once did the hearing examiner use the HHI to determine whether
the typewriter industry or any part of it was concentrated. In that in-
stance, he determined that an HHI in excess of .31 (3100 if one does not
use decimals) 58 indicated "low" concentration,5 9 which is simply incor-
rect.6 0 The hearing examiner relied on the HHI principally for quanti-
fying the impact of the acquisition. He ruled that HHI increases of .005
and .006 in the office typewriter market (50 and 60 points, if one does
not use decimals) were not significant, since the increase "was discerni-
ble only at the third decimal place. 61
Commissioner Dennison detected the hearing examiner's errors,
but nonetheless concurred reluctantly in the Commission's finding of a
54. 82 F.T.C. 793, 799 (1972) (initial decision), rev'd, 82 F.T.C. 979 (1973), modofed, 85
F.T.C. 333 (1975).
55. Id at 793.
56. Compare id at 969-70 (initial decision accepting countervailing power argument) with
Litton Indus., Inc., 82 F.T.C. 333, 1013-14 (rejecting it), modoed, 85 F.T.C. 333 (1975). Seegener-
all, infra note 117 (current debate about countervailing power). In Litton, the dominant competi-
tors were IBM (office typewriters) and SCM (portable typewriters).
57. 82 F.T.C. at 904, 906 (initial decision). The hearing examiner's adoption of this measure
may have resulted from its advocacy by defense witnesses J. Fred Weston and Betty Bock. The
examiner clearly was impressed with these experts. See id at 888.
58. See supra note 16.
59. 82 F.T.C. at 911 (initial decision). The opinion does not actually give the HHI value
used by the hearing examiner, but it states that the market share figures he used were 54.3% for
IBM and 12.6% for Royal (Litton). These market share figures alone contribute more than 3100
points toward an HHI.
60. For example, the Guidelines state that a market with an HHI in excess of 1800 is "highly
concentrated." Guidelines § III(A)(1)(c), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L. Rav. at 656.
61. 82 F.T.C. at 907. In contrast, the Guidelines say that the Department is unlikely to
challenge mergers in highly concentrated markets where the HHI increase is less than 50 points.




violation.6" However, Dennison also wrote that he did not give much
weight to increases in the CR2's and CR4's in view of the asymmetry of
market shares in the relevant product lines, 63 and that he saw no error
in using the HHI.64 The full Commission proved unwilling to condone
abandoning CR's in favor of the HHI. It noted that the examiner had
declined to use traditional CR's, and reversed him in that respect: "We
believe that the traditional four-firm concentration ratio analysis is well
suited for the purpose of merger law enforcement and see no compel-
ling reason to ignore it in this case."6"
The HHI also was rejected-and misunderstood-in its next ap-
pearance in a reported decision, United States v. Black & Decker Manu-
facturing Co. 66 The case is particularly interesting because both the
government's and the defendant's economists testified that the HHI
was preferable to concentration ratios as a measuring device.67 Despite
this unanimity of support, the court relied principally on the CR2,
CR4, and CR8. The court apparently was confused by testimony that
the HHI "reflects the number of firms in the market," 68 for it wrote as
follows:
The critical problem with the Herfindahl index, aside from its non-rec-
ognition by courts which have uniformly used concentration ratios and
its concomitant lack of comparability to data from earlier authority, is
that one or two firms could have sizable market shares but if enough
small, insignificant firms existed, the market could appear relatively de-
62. 82 F.T.C. at 970, 976 (initial decision). Dennison based his decision on the high concen-
tration and the corresponding need to prevent even small increases in concentration. He gently
suggested that the hearing examiner "failed to take into account that a statistical peculiarity of this
Index (not shared by 2-firm or 4-firm concentration ratios which antitrust lawyers are more accus-
tomed to) is that it tends to be skewed toward very small values." Id at 976 n.5.
63. Id at 976.
64. Id at 976 n.5.
65. Id at 1010 (reversal) (footnote omitted). The Commission recognized that "the
Herfindahl Index is capable of reflecting the size inequality of market shares among the industry
members, [and thus] may be useful in judging which of the two or more horizontal combinations
within a particular market is likely to have the greater anticompetitive effect from a structural
point of view." Id at 1011 n.35. It then said, somewhat confusingly, that an illegal merger contin-
ues to be illegal regardless of whether more anticompetitive ones can be hypothesized. Id
66. 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
67. Record at 1701, Black & Decker (cross-examination of government witness Jernigan) ("It
is a better measure, summary measure of industry concentration than any other single measure, I
would think."); id at 2562-63 (direct examination of defense witness Epstein) ("Economists would
prefer to use the Herfindahl Index. . . .because it has more information in it. . . . [I]f you can
get [information on each firm's market share] then you use the Herfindahl Index, because this
takes account of all the information that is available."). The government's economist objected to
using the HHI only because complete information on all market participants was available, so it
was unnecessary to use a summary measure at all. Id at 1701-02. However, he calculated CR's,
but not HHI's, for purposes of comparison. Id at 1702.




concentrated. The competitive effect of these small firms might well be
marginal, but the Herfindahl index by reflecting them, could signifi-
cantly distort by underestimation the market power of the leading
firms.
6 9
The HHI's four most recent appearances reflect somewhat greater
acceptance of it as a measure of concentration. In Marathon Oil Co. v.
Mobil Corp.7" and BASF Wyandotte Corp.,71 the tribunals, while ac-
knowledging that the measure was accepted, ignored it and relied
solely on CR's. In a third case, the Federal Trade Commission's
"shared monopoly" case,72 HHI's in excess of 2700 and CR4's of over
80% were found to indicate extremely high concentration.73 The most
recent case, Pabst Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co .,74 measured
concentration solely by the HHI in preliminarily enjoining a
transaction.
The trial court in the Mobil-Marathon litigation wrote that
"[a]ccepted measures of concentration in a particular industry include
the four- and eight-firm concentration ratios . . . and the Herfindahl
Index. . . ."I' However, no HHI's were given in the court's opinion,
which discussed only the combined shares of the two firms in various
markets and the increases in CR4's in those markets.76 The court relied
principally on the combined market shares as opposed to other meas-
ures of competitive impact.77 The HHI was not even mentioned by the
appellate court, which in affirming the decision below also relied pri-
marily on combined market shares.78
The administrative law judge in BASF Wyandotte79 wrote that
69. Black & Decker, 430 F. Supp. at 748 n.38. This reasoning is, of course, erroneous. See
supra text accompanying note 23.
70. 530 F. Supp. 315, 323 n.15 (N.D. Ohio), affd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
71. No. 9125 (FTC May 14, 1982) (initial decision) (available on LEXIS, Trade library, FTC
file), order adopted, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,941 (FTC July 12, 1982).
72. Kellogg Co., No. 8883 (FTC Sept. 1, 1981) (initial decision), notedat 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 21,864 (1981), vacated and complaint dismissed, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,899
(FTC Jan. 15, 1982).
73. Id, slip op. at 66-70. The law judge ordered the complaint dismissed because complaint
counsel had failed to show noncompetitive conduct and market performance. Id at 263-66.
74. Pabst Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., No. Civ. 82-440 (D. Del. July 21, 1982)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
75. Mobil-Marathon, 530 F. Supp. at 323 n.15. Ironically, the court's willingness to rely on
traditional concentration measures may have been based in part on testimony by George Stigler,
the HH's principal academic proponent. Stigler said that the HHI and the CR4 are "the accepted
measures of concentration," and that both measures should be reviewed. Record at 633, 754,
Mobil-Marathon.
76. 530 F. Supp. at 323-24.
77. See id at 323, 326.
78. 669 F.2d at 380.
79. No. 9125 (FTC May 14, 1982) (initial decision) (available on LEXIS, Trade library, FTC
file), order adopted, 3 TRADE REQ. REP. (CCH) 21,941 (FTC July 12, 1982).
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"[s]ubstantial authority regards the Herfindahl Index as superior to
concentration ratios."8 However, his finding of presumptive illegality
was based on a 10.6% combined market share in a "moderately concen-
trated" market (CR4 between 47.3% and 49.6%; CR8 between 71.2%
and 76.4%).1' The law judge's discussion of the HHI was confined to
his findings of fact, and he never addressed BASF's argument that
HHI's of 780 to 85082 indicated a competitive structure.
Only one case, Pabst-Heileman,83 has considered the HHI subse-
quent to the issuance of the Guidelines. 84 The judge in that case, ruling
from the bench, preliminarily enjoined JMSL Acquiring Corp. from
purchasing Pabst's voting securities and then dividing Pabst's assets be-
tween JMSL and G. Heileman Brewing Co. Although Pabst argued
that precedent compelled measuring the competitive impact of the
transaction by means of combined market shares and the CR4,85 the
court relied exclusively on the HHI to evaluate concentration and to
measure quantitatively the impact of the proposed acquisition. The
parties apparently accepted the Guidelines' HHI thresholds as appro-
priate if the HHI was to be used,86 and debated only whether to use
adjusted or unadjusted numbers. 7 Although the latter set of numbers
indicated that a government challenge was unlikely according to the
Guidelines, the court found that either set of numbers indicated that an
antitrust violation was possible and, in light of other factors,
probable.88
80. Id, slip op. at 150.
81. Id at 182. The law judge also ruled that this presumption had been rebutted by a show-
ing of effective competition, and accordingly ordered the complaint dismissed. Id at 190-91.
82. Id at 150. These were apparently premerger levels.
83. No. Civ. 82-440 (D. Del. July 21, 1982) (order granting preliminary injunction).
84. The only other case decided subsequent to the issuance of the Guidelines turned on
market definition, and the court's opinion used no measures of concentration. United States v.
Virginia Nat'l Bankshares, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871 (W.D. Va. 1982) (oral opinion).
85. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 38-39, 42-43, Pabst-
Heileman.
86. Id at 44 n.43; Brief of G. Heileman Brewing Co. in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
a Preliminary Injunction passim, Pabst-Heileman; Defendant JMSL Acquiring Corp.'s Brief in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 35-37, Pabst-Heileman.
87. Under a straight HHI calculation, the postmerger industry HHI in the upper midwest
region (which the court found to be the relevant geographic market, Pabst-Heileman, slip. op. at 4)
was approximately 1660 with an increase of approximately 50. Defendant JMSL Acquiring
Corp.'s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 37; Affidavit of
Douglas Greet at exh. 17. Plaintiff Pabst offered an "adjusted" HHI producing a postmerger
figure of 1661 with an increase of 161. Id JMSL had proposed giving Heileman the exclusive
right to sell Pabst brand beer in Michigan and Ohio, with JMSL retaining exclusive rights in the
ten other upper midwest states. Id at 18. Pabst's "adjusted" HHI increase compared the HHI
after the entire transaction was completed with an HHI computed before the merger but after the
market division.
88. Although the court did not base its finding of an antitrust violation on HHI considera-
tions only, the court had this to say about the HHI statistics:
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The HHI's generally disappointing role in the cases should not be
seen as suggesting that all tribunals uncritically apply CWs. Some of
the thinking behind the HHI has been established in the cases even if
the index itself has not. For example, as already noted, 9 one of the
principal claimed strengths of the HHI is its weighting of asymmetry.
Yet as early as 1976, the Federal Trade Commission relied in part on
the symmetry of market shares to find that a market would be competi-
tive after a merger.90 More recently, the Commission relied in part on
a concern about high market shares by the leading two firms (41.9%) to
support a presumption that a market was sufficiently concentrated that
further increases should be carefully scrutinized.91
III
EVALUATION OF THE HHI IN LIGHT OF CURRENT
ECONOMIC LEARNING
In a recent study of the HHI, Paul Pautler, a Federal Trade Com-
mission economist, concluded that the HHI is "at least as good a sum-
mary measure [of concentration] as any of the popular alternatives." 92
One can go further and say that the HHI is generally regarded, based
on economic learning available today, as slightly superior to alternative
summary measures of concentration. 93 Both theory and empirical re-
sults indicate that the HHI should be somewhat better than CR's at
predicting supracompetitive pricing, but neither theory nor empirical
results are unambiguous. 94 Moreover, there is some question as to
whether any measure of market concentration can accurately predict
supracompetitive pricing.
Largely owing to Stigler's work, the theoretical basis for using the
HHI is considerably stronger than that for using CR's. However, the
The Court recognizes that the parties' interpretation of the proper use of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index raises complex questions--such as, whether the adjusted or
nonadjusted HHI should be used to calculate the pre-merger market concentration.
Nevertheless, the Court also realizes that the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index should be
used by the courts as a "rule of thumb" and not as an ironclad rule. The Court finds that
whatever numbers are used, it is abundantly clear that the HHI factors alone and the
increases in the HHI caused by the JMSL/Heileman transaction indicate that there is at
least a possibility of an antitrust violation.
Pabst-Heileman, slip op. at 4-5.
89. See supra text accompanying note 17.
90. Warner-Lambert Co., 87 F.T.C. 812, 870 (1976).
91. Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385, 577 (1980) (Pitofsky, Comm'r) (citing Kwoka, supra note
20); see also Black & Decker, 430 F. Supp. at 748 n.38 (comparing 2-firm, 4-firm, and 8-firm
trends).
92. P. Pautler, supra note 28, at 3 1.
93. J. Grundfest, supra note 21, at 32.
94. An ideal measure of concentration should satisfy both criteria. Stigler. Comment, 76
YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1967); accord G. STIGLER, supra note 20, at 30 (adding that "[r]emarkably
little has been done along either route.").
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theoretical case for using the HHI has serious weaknesses.95 Stigler's
theory assumes that sellers cannot discover whether competitors are
cheating by learning the actual prices of competitors, but that sellers
have perfect information on customers lost or gained by competitors.96
Neither assumption seems correct.97 Moreover, John Kwoka has ob-
jected that a cartel must reach a pricing understanding and then deter
cheating as well as detect it, so a theory devoted solely to detection may
not be sufficient.98 Authors after Stigler have attempted, without over-
whelming success, to demonstrate theoretically that the HHI is an accu-
rate predictor of supracompetitive pricing.99 One recent analysis
showed that the HHI should be an accurate measure "in the context of
an industry composed of non-price-taking firms that neither cooperate
nor compete.""° Again, this description may not apply to all or even
most industries in which questionable mergers occur.
Some economic theory suggests that collusion or interdependent
pricing is facilitated by the presence of a leading firm, or firms, with
large market shares.10' The HHI's sensitivity to asymmetry is respon-
sive to this concern, but theory has not shown that the HHI will consist-
ently and accurately reflect the likelihood of such pricing. Even
Assistant Attorney General Baxter freely concedes that the HHI's
squaring of market shares is somewhat arbitrary:
Now I heard the [question from the floor], maybe improperly, as "Why
square it? Why not cube it? Why not raise it to the 1.7 power or the 2.2
power?" There I would have to say I have no answer to that....
Squaring it is in the right general direction, but whether we might not
do a great deal better by raising it to some other power than exactly 2.0
is a quite realistic possibility, an empiric question to which I have no
answer. 
102
95. J. Kwoka, supra note 42, at 18. In addition, concentration ratios are not without theoret-
ical support. See id at 17; P. Pautler, supra note 28, at 29-30 & n.30.
96. Stigler notes, as an exception, firms engaged in selling to the government where it reveals
full information about sealed bids. Stigler, supra note 42, at 48.
97. McKinnon, Stigler's Theory of Oligopoly: A Comment, 74 J. POL. ECON. 281,285 (1966);
C J. Kwoka, supra note 42, at 15.
98. J. Kwoka, supra note 42, at 16. Kwoka also questions Stigler's assumptions as to what
level of departure from expected shares will be observed, and his use of inconsistent assumptions
about old and new customers. Id at 15-16 (citing McKinnon, supra note 97).
99. Cowling & Waterson, Price-Cost Margins and Market Structure, 43 ECONOMICA 267
(1966); J. Ordover & R. Willig, Herfindfahl Concentration Index, in Background Papers re:
Merger Guidelines (S. Edwards coord.) (1981) (memorandum to ABA Section 7 Clayton Act
Comm.) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Calfornia Law Review); see J. Kwoka, supra
note 42.
100. Ordover, Sykes & Willig, supra note 23, at 1866.
101. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 12, at 621.
102. Hills, Baxter, Campbell & Turner, Panel Discussion: The New Merger Guidelines, 51
ANTITRUST L.J. 317, 326 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Pane/Discussion]; accord F. SCHERER, supra
note 4, at 59 n.46; Posner, supra note 46, at 1602.
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Furthermore, some economists believe that collusion or interdependent
pricing is facilitated by equality-not asymmetry--of market shares."0 3
To the extent this is correct (and the effect is not outweighed by other
factors) the -HI's emphasis is misplaced.'t°
Empirical work in the United States and other countries also has
failed to result in a clear preference for the HHI over the more tradi-
tional CR's. After reviewing numerous studies, Frederic Scherer con-
cluded that "[t]he results are equivocal. . . . The differences for the
most part tended to be small, suggesting that a verdict be deferred until
data of greater quality and abundance are tested."10 5 A more recent
review by Kwoka found only a small amount of evidence suggesting
that the HHI is superior to the CR4.'
0 6
Thus, although the HHI may be slightly preferred on both theoret-
ical and empirical grounds, both the CR4 and the HHI are accepted
measures of concentration, and "the authenticity of one of these meas-
ures is not so overwhelming relative to the other at this stage in our
science that one has the right to ignore the other. ... 107 Moreover,
the literature concerning "critical levels" of CR's is far richer than the
literature concerning the HHI. Numerous studies consider the point at
which CR's suggest reason for concern about supracompetitive pric-
ing.'0 8 There is no comparable body of literature for the HHI.' °9 As-
sistant Attorney General Baxter concedes, with commendable candor,
that the Guidelines' HHI thresholds are somewhat arbitrary. 1° For
instance, seven months before the Guidelines were issued, one of their
103. See F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 160; Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, andAntitrust
Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 447 (1982); see also P. Pautler, A Review of the Economic Basis
for Broad-Based Horizontal Merger Policy 54 n.197 (July 1982) (unpublished manuscript forth-
coming in the ANTITRUST BULL.).
104. See F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 58.
105. Id at 279-80.
106. J. Kwoka, supra note 42, at 21, 30-31. Kwoka also found both measures to be inferior to
the CR2, see also Kwoka, supra note 20, at 103, 106, 108, but his results have been attacked by
several commentators, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 281 n.48; Phillips, Comments on Weiss, in
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 286, 289 (0. Williamson ed. 1980).
107. Record at 663, 754 (testimony of George Stigler), Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530
F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), affd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982);
accord R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 12, at 462.
108. Eg., Dalton & Penn, The Concentration-Profitability Relationshp: Is There a Critical
Concentration Ratio?, 25 J. INDUS. ECON. 133 (1972); White, Searchingfor the Critical Concentra-
tion Ratio: An Application ofthe "Switching ofRegimes" Technique, in STUDIES IN NONLINEAR
ESTIMATION 61 (S. Goldfeld & R. Quandt eds. 1976).
109. The difficulty of computing HHI's has limited their use in the literature. ,See Kelly, .4
Generalized Interpretation of/he Herfndahl Index, 48 S. ECON. J. 50, 50 (1981); Markham, supra
note 22, at 259.
110. Baxter, supra note 6, at 292 ("Mergers on both sides of those lines really should be
treated the same. The lines themselves are arbitrary and reflect the fact that we were born with




principal drafters identified 1600 as the critical HHI threshold indicat-
ing high concentration. t t t On the other hand, George Stigler has testi-
fied that he does not become concerned about industry concentration
until the HHI reaches 2000 to 2500.112
Apart from the question of whether CR4's or the HHI enjoys
stronger theoretical and empirical support, during the past decade there
has been increasing questioning of the assumption that concentration,
however measured, is causally linked with supracompetitive pricing 1 3
Importantly, observers in the "liberal" and "conservative" schools have
increasingly recognized that there is often a strong correlation between
profitability and individual firm market shares. 14  Scholarly debate
now focuses on two issues, namely whether concentration also makes a
significant difference (and if so, under what circumstances), and
whether the correlation between market share and profitability repre-
sents only the greater efficiency and cost savings of firms with high
market shares, or, as some evidence suggests, also may reflect an ele-
ment of pricing discretion at least where products are differentiated. "'
This debate has considerable importance for merger enforcement,
for it raises the question of whether high concentration independently
contributes toward supracompetitive pricing. An interesting recent
study found evidence that concentration acts only as a proxy for high
individual-firm market shares." 6 If this is correct, it could suggest that
substantially more attention should be given to market shares than to
111. Changing Currents in Antitrust Enforcement are Probed by Government Officials, Practi-
tioners, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1040, A-2, at A-5 (Nov. 19, 1981).
112. Record at 646-47, Marathon Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aj'd, 669
F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
113. E.g., Bork, Emerging Substantive Standards-Developments and Needfor Change, 50 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 179, 184 (1982) ("Oligopoly theory has been decimated in the past few years, both by
theoretical argument and empirical studies."). The literature is exhaustively reviewed in P.
Pautler, supra note 103.
114. See F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 282-85; Demsetz, Two Systems of Belle/About Monop-
oly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J.
Weston eds. 1974); Gale & Branch, Concentration versus market share: which determinesperform-
ance and why does it matter?, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 83 (1982); Kwoka, supra note 20; J. Ordover &
R. Willig, supra note 99, at 6. But cf. Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937, 944-47, 958-59 (1981) (arguing that market power is a function of market
share, market elasticity of demand, and elasticity of supply of competing firms, so inferences from
market share alone can be misleading).
115. See F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 284; P. Pautler, supra note 103; Porter, The Structure
Within Industries and Companies' Performance, 61 REV. EcON. & STAT. 214, 226-27 (1979). But
c Gale & Branch, supra note 114, at 92-97 (efficiency and cost saving more important than
pricing effects); D. Ravenscraft, Structure-Profit Relationships at the Line of Business and Indus-
try Level (Mar. 1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with the California Law Review) (same).
116. D. Ravenscraft, supra note 115, at 26. Ravenscraft's work follows earlier and not alto-
gether successful efforts to separate the effects of market share from the effects of concentration.
See Shepherd, The Elements o/Market Structure, 54 REv. ECON. & STAT. 25 (1972).
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concentration, whether measured by CR's or by the HHI."7
IV
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND WISDOM OF THE CHANGE
By switching from traditional concentration ratios to the HHI, the
new Guidelines abandoned CR's in favor of a measure of which, it was
estimated, "not one in ten members of the merger and acquisition bar
has even heard.""' 8 The significance and wisdom of using the HHI
instead of CR's is different for each of the three ways the Guidelines
use the index: to establish safe harbor post merger concentration levels,
to establish a concentration level above which the Department will
look upon a merger with increased scrutiny, and to measure the likely
competitive impact of a merger.t
t9
A. Safe Harbor
Because of their insensitivity to the division of market shares
among the leading firms, concentration ratios are unsuitable for estab-
lishing safe harbors of low concentration where mergers will not be
challenged. Adopting the HHI for this purpose, however, will probably
result in little improvement in section 7 enforcement. For one thing,
there is some question whether safe harbors are needed at all. For an-
other, even if the need for safe harbors is conceded, the HHI might not
be well suited to the task.
The unsuitability of using CR's to establish safe harbors was ex-
plained by Posner more than a decade ago.' 20 He suggested that a
plausible CR-based rule would exempt mergers from challenge unless
the CR8 was 50% or more after the merger. However, in a market con-
sisting of two firms each having a 20% share and numerous firms with
de minimis shares, such a rule would allow the leading firms to
merge-which was implicitly unacceptable.' 21 The same analysis
117. If concentration by itself is of less concern than high market shares, particularly of lead-
ing firms, this also supports the suggestion that mergers of firms with relatively large market
shares occasionally should be permitted in order to allow more effective competition for leading
firms. See P. Pautler, supra note 103, at 60; Ordover, Sykes and Willig, supra note 23, at 1870-71;
Porter, Strategic Interaction: Some Lessons From Industry Historiesfor Theory andAntitrust Policy,
in STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 449, 495-97 (S. Salop ed. 1981). But see 4
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, at 912b.
118. Pelster & Stangle, New Antitrust Chief andHe(findahl Index, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1981, at
1, col. 1, at 2, col. 1.
119. See supra Section I-B.
120. Posner, supra note 46, at 1602-03.
121. Id at 1603. Posner was writing about a general standard to use in judging mergers, not a
safe harbor as such, but the analysis is the same. His preferred standard was the same one
adopted by the Guidelines for markets that are not "highly concentrated," namely a 100 point
increase in the HHI. Id
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would apply to a standard based on the CR4. To be useful, any safe
harbor level would have to be sufficiently high that it would have the
unwanted effect of allowing mergers of leading firms with large market
shares. For instance, few observers would consider a market concen-
trated unless the CR4 was 45% or higher, 22 yet few would presume a
merger creating a firm with a 45% share to be lawful. 123 Thus, it is
inappropriate to use CR's for safe harbor purposes.
Safe harbors may not be needed at all, however. Certainly it
would be a mistake to guarantee that mergers in this region will not be
challenged. Posner proposed such a guarantee many years ago, 24 and
at that time it may have made sense as a means of reducing the risk that
a merger unexpectedly would be challenged after consummation.
Since that time, however, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act has been en-
acted,125 and participants in most substantial mergers now learn, from
feedback during the waiting period mandated by that Act, whether
challenge is likely.'26 Given this relatively quick and inexpensive re-
view and the absence of moral stigma associated with proposing illegal
mergers, uncertainty about the likelihood of government challenge is
not likely to prevent many mergers.
Another problem with a safe harbor of low concentration is the
incentive it provides for firms to merge. If an industry is near the safe
harbor threshold and rumors suggest that mergers will be occurring, an
industry member contemplating a future horizontal merger will be
under pressure to act quickly.127 Since this effect adds to merger plan-
ning a strategic consideration unrelated to economic efficiency, it can
be expected to result in some suboptimal decisions.
Even if a safe harbor is advisable at all, the wisdom of using the
HHI to demarcate it depends on one's confidence in the accuracy of the
HHI as a predictor of supracompetitive pricing. As the previous Sec-
tion has shown, the HHI's accuracy is far from unfailing. Even the
Guidelines qualify .their reliance on the HHI with the "leading firm
proviso." 128
122. See authorities cited in Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385, 577 & n.9 (1980).
123. See infra note 135.
124. Posner, supra note 46, at 1603.
125. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94435, 90 Stat.
1383.
126. See PanelDiscussion, supra note 102, at 334-35 (remarks of Thomas J. Campbell, Direc-
tor, FTC Bureau of Competition). See generally S. AX1NN, B. Foao & N. STOLL, AcQuisiTIONS
UNDER THE HART-SCOTr-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS AcT (1979).
127. It is interesting to compare the concern of practicing antitrust attorneys about this effect,
see Spivack, The New Merger Guidelines Are Substantially Different, Legal Times (Washington),
Aug. 2, 1982, at 38, 41, with the antitrust agencies' lack of concern, see Panel Discussion, supra
note 102, at 330.
128. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Admittedly, concern that merger enforcement not interfere with
the achievement of efficiency has been a recurrent theme in the recent
literature,' 29 and it has been recognized that economies of scale can be
achieved only at levels of production that, in some industries, may re-
quire substantial market shares. 130 However, most scale economies can
be enjoyed without market shares greater than 14%--a combined share
unlikely to be challenged, according to the Guidelines, in all but highly
concentrated markets. 13' One study of twelve major United States in-
dustries found that in only one such industry would national market
shares in excess of 14% be needed to recognize most if not all advan-
tages of multi-plant size.'3 2 Achieving efficiencies is least likely to re-
quire large market shares in very unconcentrated markets, 33 and yet it
is in those markets that the HHI-based safe harbor serves presump-
tively to allow mergers of firms with very large shares. Safe harbors
based on HHI's are thus not well suited to respond to concerns about
efficiency.' 34
At no safe harbor threshold do the benefits of establishing a safe
harbor appear to outweigh the costs. The level established by the
Guidelines-1000 points-probably is too high. The weight of the eco-
nomic learning suggests that in certain circumstances firms with 30%
market shares-which could be formed while staying within the 1000
point threshold-can enjoy some market power. 35 Indeed, there is
129. See, e.g., Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7ofthe Clayton Act, 30 CASE W.
RES. L. REv 381 (1980); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 699 (1977). The Guidelines provide for an "efficiencies defense," but only in "extraordinary
cases"; they claim that the thresholds are sufficiently high that available efficiencies can be
achieved in "the overwhelming majority of cases." Guidelines § V(A), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,502, 71
CALIF. L. REV. at 665.
130. F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 81-118.
131. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
132. F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 117-19. The industries were beer brewing, cigarettes, fabric
weaving, paints, petroleum refining, shoes, glass bottles, cement, ordinary steel, bearings, refriger-
ators, and storage batteries. Only the refrigerator industry required a share of between 14% and
20% to achieve scale economies. Scherer noted, however, that the steel industry may have
changed since he studied it, and he also mentioned that preliminary analyses of the Profit Impact
of Market Strategy (PIMS) data set "imply large-firm cost advantages, real and pecuniary, greater
than those uncovered through [his] interview survey of 12 manufacturing industries." Id at 284.
133. Turner, Observations on the New Merger Guidelines and the 1968 Merger Guidelines, 51
ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 311 (1982).
134. In contrast, the Edwards task force of lawyers and economists proposed a presumption
that mergers involving combined shares of less than 10% (or less than 20%, if one firm's market
share is less than 2%) would not be challenged. Edwards Task Force, supra note 9, at 1561.
135. Id. at 1563; cf Kwoka, supra note 20, at 107 (where the leading firm had at least a 26%
share, price-cost margins increased by 4 percentage points); Landes & Posner, supra note 114, at
972-73 (where the elasticity of supply is 0 and the elasticity of demand is 2, a merger of 20% and
10% share firms would increase market power by 5.9%, even if collusion is not facilitated); Wentz,
Mobility Factors in Antitrust Cases: Assessing Market Power in Light of Conditions Affecting Entry
andFringe Expansion, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1545, 1575 (1982) (in a market with three 10% firms and
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even some question whether the Department will honor its commit-
ment not to challenge such mergers.'36 Recall also that a market with
an -IHI of 1000 could have a CR4 of over 60%.117  Lowering the safe
harbor threshold to 500 points would permit the formation by merger
of firms with up to only 21%-22% shares, and the attaining of CR4s of
up to only 45%,138 but consider how rarely such a safe harbor could
apply. The HHI before the merger would have to be below 400 and the
merging firms would have to be contributing more than 98 points to
this amount.139 Such a merger is conceivable, but neither so common
nor so clearly beneficial that the added complexity of establishing a
safe harbor seems justifiable.
For these reasons, establishing a safe harbor of low concentration
probably is ill-advised. A guaranteed safe harbor, and a safe harbor of
1000 HHI points, seem particularly inappropriate. Lowering that
threshold would reduce both the costs and the benefits, with the bene-
fits never quite catching up with the costs.
B. Increased Scrutiny
Use of the HHI instead of CR's to specify a threshold to trigger
increased scrutiny by antitrust enforcement agencies is unlikely to have
a substantial effect on the selection of mergers for challenge. Given
this, and given also the costs associated with changing indexes, there is
no persuasive reason for changing to the HHI unless change is desired
for its own sake.
The threshold triggering increased scrutiny is considerably less im-
portant in the new Guidelines than in the 1968 version. In the 1968
Guidelines a finding of high concentration resulted in a downward ad-
justment in the market share combinations likely to be challenged,
whereas in the new Guidelines a similar finding merely moves a case
from the "unlikely to challenge" category to an indeterminate category
with the remaining firms being only fringe participants, a merger of two of the leaders would
result in a potential for supracompetitive pricing well above what market concentration indexes
alone would indicate). But see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 221-22 (1978); Y. BROZEN,
MERGERS IN PERSPECTIVE 80-85 (1982) (combined shares of even 50% will not increase prices if
there are at least two major competitors). See generally sources cited supra note 114.
136. See Turner, Horizontal Mergers, in TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST
SEMINAR (PLI) 143, 153-54 (Oct. 7, 1982) ("1 would hesitate to encourage a merger of two leading
firms (each with, say, 10% or more of the market) who are much larger than their competitors.").
137. See supra note 28.
138. See P. Pautler, supra note 28, at 14 (fig. 1).
139. Increases of less than 100 points are presumptively permitted in all but highly concen-
trated markets even without a safe harbor. The smallest combined share permitted by the 100-
point threshold is 14% (7% & 7%, with an HHI increase of 98 points), and before merging two such
firms would contribute 98 points to an HHI.
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where further analysis is required. 4 ° Moreover, the new Guidelines
emphasize the importance of numerous factors other than market
shares and concentration, 4' including especially the complex issue of
ease of entry.'42 Since it has become a signal for further study rather
than for enforcement action, and since market share is itself but one of
many factors considered, the "highly concentrated" threshold is of lim-
ited significance.
Accordingly, using the HHI instead of CR's for that threshold
would have a significant effect only if the results of the two measures
frequently differ. They do not. Several empirical studies have found
that the CR4 and the HHI have "highly correlated numerical val-
ues."'143 Moreover, the correlation may be especially high in very con-
centrated markets.'" Thus, the adoption of the HHI is unlikely to
change the results of many merger reviews.1 45
Even allowing for the probability that changing from CR's to the
HHI will rarely make any significant difference, changing to the HHI
would be appropriate if the HHI were clearly preferable to CR's as a
matter of theory and empirical proof. However, as has already been
shown, 46 that is not the case. The HHI may be slightly superior to the
CR4 as a predictor of supracompetitive pricing, but several practical
disadvantages counsel against changing to it, given its limited benefits,
unless change is desired for its own sake.
First, the HHI requires more information, is somewhat harder to
use, and may be subject to greater error than CR's.t4 7 The cost of
140. Compare 1968 Guidelines, supra note 8, para. 5, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 6884 with
Guidelines § III(A)(l)(c), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,497, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 656.
141. See supra note 36. The Federal Trade Commission may give even greater attention to
these other factors. FTC, Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers § III (June 14, 1982), re-
printed in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 546, at 71, 75 (June 16, 1982) (special supplement to 2
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4225 (Aug. 9, 1982)).
142. Guidelines § III(B), 47 Fed. Reg. at 47,828, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 657. See generalo 4 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, 11917; W. BAUMOL, J. PANZER & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); Wentz, supra note 135 (discussing
complexity and importance of determining ease of entry).
143. F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 58 & nn.51-52; Bailey & Boyle, The Optimal Measure of
Concentration, 66 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 702 (1971). But cf Kwoka, Does the Choice ofConcentration
Measure Really Matter?, 29 J. INDUS. ECON. 445 (1981).
144. See Schmalensee, supra note 45, at 188, 192 (defining "highly concentrated" as CR4
greater than or equal to 50%). But see Hause, The Measurement of Concentrated Industrial Struc-
ture and the Size Distribution ofFirms, 6 ANNALS OF ECON. & Soc. MFAs. 73, 94-95 (1977) (corre-
lation between CR4 and HHI in a study of Swedish industries was relatively low, and particularly
low for "highly concentrated" industries-defined as those in which HHI equalled or exceeded
1600).
145. Changing indexes is particularly unlikely to change such results if, as we have seen has
happened on occasion, reviewers using CR's consider the distribution of market shares.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 95-112.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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changing indexes is imposed not only on government agencies review-
ing mergers for enforcement purposes, but also on businesses and their
attorneys reviewing mergers in advance without benefit of discovery.'48
Use of the HHI complicates business planning of mergers because the
HHI is considerably less familiar to American business, although the
Guidelines may change this, and the significance of various HHI levels
is less apparent to the untrained observer th an the significance of CR's.
Second, changing indexes may have a ratchet-like effect. Where
the case law is against the Department, the Department probably will
not prevail regardless of the Guidelines; however, regardless of the case
law, the Department will have difficulty challenging mergers ostensibly
permitted by the Guidelines. 149 The importance of this effect should
not be overstated, however, since much of it would be associated with
any easing of the Guidelines.
Third, the Guidelines' use of the HHI will complicate and make
less predictable government and private merger litigation. With a few,
mostly unfortunate exceptions, judicial precedents use CR's and com-
bined shares rather than HHI's and changes in HHI's.150 The Depart-
ment recognizes it will have to try cases under existing law, so its recent
merger complaints use CR's, combined shares, and HHI's.t15 The
Pabst-Heileman experience suggests that private litigation also will in-
volve proof of and argument about HHI's as well as traditional meas-
ures.'52 Thus, merger litigation will be complicated by the addition of
an extra issue-which measure to use-and the need to calculate and
prove the significance of HHI's as well as traditional measures. 53
148. The need to have every firm's market share before an HHI can be computed also may
increase the burden of discovery requests.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 464 F. Supp. 660, 664-65 (C.D. Cal. 1979)
(temporary restraining order denied where defendant showed 1968 Guidelines not violated);
United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1280 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (complaint
dismissed, in part because 1968 Guidelines not violated). But see, e.g., United States v. Northwest
Indus., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1084 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F.
Supp. 1061, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (recognizing that the Guidelines are not binding on either the
Department or the courts).
The Guidelines have this to say about the problem:
In appropriate cases, the Department will challenge mergers that are competitively ob-
jectionable under the general principles of the Guidelines regardless of whether they are
covered by the specific standards .... [T]he Guidelines are designed primarily to indi-
cate when the Department is likely to challenge mergers, not how it will conduct the
litigation of cases that it decides to bring.
Guidelines § I, 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,494, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 649.
150. See supra Section II-B. The 1968 Guidelines, in comparison, were described as a restate-
ment of § 7 law. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 10, at 69; see also authorities cited in
Joffe, Guidelines-Past, Present and Future, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 187, 190 n.9 (1981).
151. Interview with Mark P. Leddy, supra note 5.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88.
153. The result can be one of ships passing in the night, as in the Pabst-Heileman litigation,
where Pabst's brief focused almost exclusively on traditional measures and the case law, JMSL's
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Moreover, where the HHI suggests a different result than would obtain
under the traditional measures, use of the HHI by itself makes the out-
come of litigation less certain.
Fourth, the palpable simplicity of the CR serves to make unthink-
ing reliance on it less likely, perhaps, than will be the case with the all-
inclusive HHI. Choosing the best available summary measure of con-
centration is less important than understanding the uses and limitations
of whatever measure is chosen.' 54 The antitrust agencies, and most
courts, now understand the limitations of CR's and often consider them
in light of developing economic wisdom.'55 HHI's, although appearing
to be more precise and sophisticated than CR's, are only slightly supe-
rior, and it would be unfortunate if the HHI were regarded as substan-
tially less fallible.
For these reasons, the costs of changing indexes outweigh the ben-
efits, unless change is a desirable end in itself. As we shall see below,
that in fact may be the case.
C. Impact of a Merger
Using the change in the HHI as the quantitative measure of the
impact of a merger differs little from the 1968 Guidelines' approach.
The 1968 Guidelines specified numerical thresholds that roughly ap-
proximate a 75 point increase in the HHI for mergers in "less highly
concentrated" markets, 5 6 and a 35 point increase for mergers in "high-
ly concentrated" markets, 157 as opposed to the 1982 Guidelines' thresh-
old increases of 100 points and 50 points, respectively. 158 Thus, the
and Heileman's briefs focused almost exclusively on HHI's and the Guidelines, and the court
discussed only HHI's but never decided whether the Guideline thresholds were exceeded. See
supra text accompanying notes 83-88.
154. F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 59.
155. Cf supra text accompanying notes 89-91. A thorough analysis is particularly important
because the economic learning about market structure and behavior is in a state of flux. P.
Pautler, supra note 103, at 43; Sullivan, Thirty Years of Merger Law Enforcement: Choosing
Among Competing Styles ofAnalsis in the Development of Merger Policy, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1395,
1407 (1980). Most of the important research has concerned CR's and market shares, and these
should continue to be important in future research. See, e.g., Schmalensee, supra note 45, at 186;
see also supra text accompanying notes 108-09. The use of the HHI may be expected to increase
as a result of its espousal by the Guidelines, but difficulty in collecting data should continue to
make CR's at least as common.
156. This is depicted graphically in P. Pautler, supra note 28, at 19 fig. 2. The 1968 Guide-
lines' threshold, in HHI equivalents, are 50 points (5% & 5%), 80 points (10% & 4%), 90 points
(15% & 3%), 80 points (20% & 2%), and 50 points (25% & 1%). 1968 Guidelines, supra note 8,
para. 6, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 6884.
157. See P. Pautler, supra note 28, at 19. The 1968 Guidelines' threshold, in HHI equivalents,
are 32 points (4% & 4%), 40 points (10% & 2%), and 30 points (15% & 1%). 1968 Guidelines, supra
note 8, para. 5, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 6884.
158. See supra note 32.
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"change" to the HHI really is not much of a change.' 59 This Section
will briefly explore whether the Guidelines could have been improved
upon by adopting instead a combined share measure of impact. 160
The combined market share approach finds support in the case
law, 6 ' and from Areeda and Turner, who favor a 13% combined share
test for presumptive unlawfulness.' 62 It is simple and easy to under-
stand and apply. Moreover, basing the threshold on combined market
share would recognize that minimum market shares often can be
needed to achieve efficiencies, but that shares above a certain level are
rarely necessary.'
63
In contrast, the Guidelines' 100 point standard would allow, pre-
sumptively, the formation by merger of firms with 35% shares (34% and
1%), t64 26% shares (24% and 2%), or 19% shares (16% and 3%). Such
shares are likely to exceed those needed for efficiency gains, and ac-
cordingly there is less to be lost by presuming them to be unlawful in
the first instance. Conversely, the regular challenging of mergers in
highly concentrated industries involving HHI increases of 50 points or
less-for instance, if a Justice Department more hostile to mergers low-
ers the threshold--could prevent the formation of firms with 10% or
smaller market shares. Such shares may well be needed for efficient
production, and preventing their attainment could be costly to society.
A combined market share test would be more sensitive to this problem.
159. Although the new Guidelines raise the thresholds, switching to the HHI to determine
"high concentration" means that certain markets will be highly concentrated under the new stan-
dard (HHI above 1800) or the previous standard (CR4 of 75%), but not both, and since an HHI of
1800 corresponds most closely with a CR4 of 67%-70%, see supra note 30, more markets will be
highly concentrated under the new standard than under the previous one. Nonetheless, the new
Guidelines should prove more lenient than the 1968 Guidelines, because under the new Guide-
lines a finding of "high concentration" merely shifts many mergers into an indeterminate category
where further scrutiny is applied, while such a finding under the 1968 Guidelines rendered a
comparable category of mergers subject to presumptive challenge, and because the 1968 Guide-
lines, unlike the new ones, imposed stricter standards whenever a trend toward increasing concen-
tration had been shown. See Spivack, supra note 127; cf. Scarbrough & Pfunder, supra note 28
(the extent of the additional leniency will depend on enforcement discretion).
160. Little discussion is needed to show that it would be impractical to measure the size of a
merger by the resulting change in a concentration ratio, rather than the HHI. The unacceptability
of CR's for this purpose stems from their insensitivity to changes involving firms already included
in the calculation. Where the fifth largest share of a market is 5%, the CR4 will increase by 5%
whether a merger involves the first and second firms or the fourth and fifth. 4 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 4, 1 913b1.
161. See supra note 51.
162. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, 1 907c (also proposing an 18-20% threshold
where one firm's share was 2% or less). A de minimis exception is needed because section 7 only
prevents lessening of competition. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
163. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
164. The Guidelines' "leading firm proviso," see supra note 31, indicates that the Department
may be likely to challenge a merger involving a leading firm with a 35% share even if the 100
point threshold is not exceeded.
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An HHI-based test also is more sensitive to errors in computing
market shares. Problems in making accurate calculations are exacer-
bated by the multiplication of shares. Whenever two merging firms
have different shares, the size of the smaller share is critical, since it is
being multipled by the larger.165
If one were certain that merger enforcement should be concerned
only with preventing increases in the likelihood of tacit and actual col-
lusion, and that the HHI accurately predicted this likelihood, the in-
crease in the HHI nonetheless would be the obvious choice of
measure. 166 If, however, one is uncertain about the accuracy of the
HHI as a predictor of supracompetitive pricing, one should be more
hesitant. Furthermore, if there is a significant chance that individual
market shares are linked directly with supracompetitive pricing, 167 it
makes more sense to look at the market share of the firm created by the
merger than at the increase in the HHI.
D. Indirect Effect of Using the HHi
Decades of merger litigation have left precedents finding viola-
tions of section 7 based on CR's, combined shares, and concentration
trends that would not trouble the current Antitrust Division. 168 These
old cases continue to be cited in briefs and judicial decisions, and inevi-
tably may influence the thinking of Antitrust Division staff, the Federal
Trade Commission, and the courts. Had the Antitrust Division merely
adjusted the 1968 Guidelines by raising the thresholds, enforcement
staff and adjudicators would -have compared the new Guidelines'
thresholds to those of the 1968 Guidelines and to the case law. The
natural tendency, especially of adjudicators, would have been to view
the new thresholds in that context, and as only another source of gui-
dance. Instead, adopting the HHI offers a clean break with the past.
Court decisions offer no useful guidance as to what thresholds should
raise concern, and the literature offers little more. In the Pabst-Heile-
165. This is an illustration of the mathematical principle that the percentage error of the
product of two quantities is approximately equal to the sum of the percentage errors in each of the
quantities. Measuring a market share to a precision of one percentage point may be acceptable for
an 8% firm (12.5% error) but not for a 1% firm (100% error).
The problem is further compounded by the unavoidable time lag in obtaining data. A
merger challenged in 1983 will be judged, at least in the first instance, on 1982 (or even 1981)
market shares. Estimation of 1983 market shares will inevitably introduce error due to the guess-
work involved.
166. Cf. Ordover, Sykes & Willig, supra note 23 (in certain instances changes in the HHI can
be useful indicators of mergers' competitive effects).
167. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
168. See Fox, supra note 41, at 563-65, 575-91. Some of these precedents are criticized even
by the most liberal commentators. See Kramer, Antitrunt Today: The Baxterization of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 1287, 1290.
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man litigation, for instance, none of the briefs suggested thresholds dif-
fering from those in the Guidelines. The Guidelines' thresholds, for all
practical purposes, are "the only game in town."
Changing indexes probably accelerated the acceptance by the An-
titrust Division staff of a somewhat more relaxed attitude toward merg-
ers, since the HHI has been the standard measure of concentration
starting shortly after the arrival of Assistant Attorney General Baxter.
It may have had the same result at the Federal Trade Commission,
where the staff now regularly reviews HHI's, but only rarely examines
CR's and combined shares. 169 Other government agencies charged
with reviewing mergers also have started using, or are considering us-
ing, the HHI, and at least thus far have used the numerical thresholds
in the Guidelines.'70 The effect on the courts is more difficult to pre-
dict. The Pabst-Heileman litigation suggests that courts will rely on the
Guidelines, although perhaps not as heavily as in the past, and on the
HHI. To the extent this occurs, and to the extent the HHI becomes
accepted as the preferred quantitative measure of concentration and of
the impact of a merger on competition, reversion to the former judicial
hostility to mergers may become less likely. It is in these ways that the




Although the Justice Department states that using the HHI instead
of CR's is a "significant" change,' 71 the change is more of form and
language than of substance. Few decisions as to whether to challenge a
merger will come out differently because the threshold for increased
scrutiny turns on an HHI rather than a comparable CR4. Quantita-
tively measuring the impact of a merger by the increase in the HHI
may be more elegant than using the paired market shares in the 1968
Guidelines, but had comparable thresholds been selected the results
169. Interview with Walter Vandaele, Economic Adviser to the Director, FTC Bureau of
Competition (Jan. 14, 1983). The FTC staff now routinely examines increases in HHI's caused by
mergers, but also considers market shares of merging firms and other competitors in addition to
other factors.
170. Delegation of Authority Regarding Holding Company Acquisition and Debt, 48 Fed.
Reg. 170, 172; Processing of Applications, 48 Fed. Reg. 178, 185, 187 (Jan. 3. 1983) (Federal Home
Loan Bank Board regulations); Interview with Stephen Rhoads, Senior Economist, Federal Re-
serve Board (Jan. 21, 1983) (Federal Reserve Board considering adopting HHI for its merger
guidelines).
171. Victor Kramer recently made an observation similar to the one proposed here, and in-
ferred a slightly sinister purpose for the shift: "[VMe are still going to use the numbers game...
but we are going to use a different set of numbers. . . . One need not be clairvoyant to predict
that the objective is to permit mergers that the existing merger guidelines suggest are unlawful."
Kramer, supra note 168.
172. DOJ Explanation, supra note 14, at 6881-2.
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generally would have been the same. Only for purposes of establishing
a safe harbor would using the HHI instead of a CR change the out-
come of many merger reviews (indeed, CR's are clearly unsuited for
this purpose), but this is a new and probably ill-advised use of a con-
centration measure.
It is through the change in language and form of measurement
that adoption of the HHI may have further reaching consequences.
Given the current paucity of alternative sources of guidance as to ap-
propriate HHI thresholds, adoption of the HHI by adjudicators as the
preferred measure of concentration could accord great importance to
the numerical thresholds of the new Guidelines. By contrast, the pleth-
ora of sources of guidance as to appropriate CR and market share
thresholds would have minimized the impact of the new thresholds us-
ing traditional measures. Use of the HHI may have already contrib-
uted to the prompt institutionalization in the antitrust agencies of the
more lenient standards of the new Guidelines. In the HHI, the Justice
Department may have found, whether by inadvertence or design, a de-
vice that will facilitate the prompt, widespread, and perhaps enduring
acceptance of a particular set of policy preferences. If, and only if,
these new policies represent a substantial improvement over the status
quo, do the benefits of shifting to the HHI outweigh the costs of in-
creased complexity, uncertainty, and possible undue deference to an
imperfect index.
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